We investigate the problem of privately answering queries on databases consisting of points in [0, 1] ℓ . We prove the following results. First, we show that there exists a computationally efficient ε-differentially private mechanism that releases a query class parametrized by additively separable Hölder continuous functions. Second, we show that, if the query class is instead parametrized by additively separable analytic functions, the accuracy can be significantly boosted. Moreover, both our mechanisms operate in the non-interactive setting, i.e. they output a fixed data structure which can be used to answer all the queries of interest without further accessing the sensitive database.
Introduction
With the ease of access to sensitive and personal data, privacy has become one of the most relevant issues in data analysis. The major challenge consists of conciliating two conflicting objectives, namely releasing useful statistics of sensitive data while providing strong privacy guarantees for the individual records. In recent years, differential privacy [7] has become the standard paradigm for privacy-preserving statistical analyses. This notion assures that the output of a mechanism which releases some information about a database is not significantly influenced by the presence or absence of an individual data record. This implies that an adversary who aims at violating an individual's privacy gains very limited information by observing the output of such a mechanism.
In this paper, we aim at designing differentially private mechanisms for answering classes of linear queries, which have been the focus of an extensive study in the differential privacy literature [3, 11, 4, 10, 12, 19, 13] . We furthermore require that these mechanisms are computationally efficient, i.e. they run in polynomial time in the relevant parameters, especially the size n of the database and the dimension ℓ of the data domain. Although we might be tempted to look for such mechanisms for general linear queries, recent results [18] gave evidence that efficient mechanisms which can accurately and privately answer more than O(n 2 ) general linear queries do not exist. Therefore, the community has started analyzing subclasses of linear queries that possess properties which can be exploited in the design of efficient private query release mechanisms [4, 12, 19, 13] .
In this work, we continue this line of research and consider query classes of the form Q F = {F (·, x)|x ∈ X ⊆ Y} defined by a function F : X n × Y → R such that, for every database D ∈ X n , F (D, ·) is an additively separable (γ, L)-Hölder continuous function or an additively separable analytic function. In both cases, we provide simple, computational efficient and differentially private mechanisms for answering (possibly uncountably many) queries from Q F . Moreover, both our mechanisms operate in the non-interactive setting, i.e. they output a fixed data structure (or synopsis) which can be used to answer all the queries of interest without further accessing the sensitive database D. At a high level, our mechanisms are based on two well-known polynomial approximations, namely the Bernstein polynomial for Hölder continuous functions and the polynomial interpolant at the roots of unity for analytic functions. The idea behind our approach is based on the observation that a polynomial approximation of F (D, ·) (when it exists) already provides a computationally efficient way for computing accurate answers to the queries in Q F . Unfortunately, such a polynomial cannot be used directly, since it heavily depends on the sensitive database D. When this polynomial is a Bernstein polynomial or the interpolant at the roots of unity, we prove that it is possible to "sanitize" its coefficients without ruining the accuracy of the answers provided. If we restrict our analysis on counting queries parametrized by additively separable (γ, L)-Hölder continuous functions, our mechanism runs in time linear in the dimension of the space and the size of the database and has an additive error O(ℓ 1+ξ /n ξ ), where ξ ≤ 1/3 depends only on the parameter γ. If the class is instead parametrized by analytic functions, we prove that the running time becomes poly-logarithmic in n and ℓ, and the error isÕ(ℓ 2 /n). In Section 6, we present some concrete examples of such classes.
Related work
The problem of private query release has been studied in a series of interesting works [3, 11, 18, 4, 10, 12, 19, 13] . In [3] , Blum et al. show that it is (information theoretically) possible to privately and accurately answer exponentially many linear queries, but the mechanism they provide is not computationally efficient. The work in [3] has been subsequently extended and improved in different ways. One of the most significant results in this regard is the multiplicative weights mechanism of Hardt et al. [11] , whose running time is however exponential in the dimension of the data. The hope of finding mechanisms for arbitrary (possibly exponentially many) linear queries which can achieve accuracy comparable to [3, 11] while running in polynomial time in the size of the database and the dimension of the data has been disrupted by the striking result of Ullman [18] . In his work, it is shown that assuming the existence of one way functions no polynomial time mechanism is able to answer more than O(n 2 ) arbitrary linear queries. For this reason, in order to design computationally efficient query release mechanisms, we need to restrict on classes of queries which possess some properties that can be exploited. For binary query classes, Blum et al. [4] provided an efficient algorithm for privately releasing linear queries defined over predicates with very sparse truth tables. In [10] , a polynomial time mechanism for releasing the class of conjunctions is provided, although the error is measured in the average case on conjunctions drawn from a product distribution.
Our contribution is mostly related to [12, 19, 13] . In [12] , Huang et al. give an efficient mechanism for answering distance queries defined over an arbitrary metric space. In contrast to [12] , we consider query classes parametrized by additively separable Hölder continuous or analytic functions. Wang et al. [19] provide an efficient algorithm for answering K-smooth linear queries over [−1, 1] ℓ , for a constant dimen-sion ℓ. A smooth query is specified by a function whose partial derivatives up to order K are all bounded. Note first that such a query is in particular a Lipschitz function, which is a special case of a Hölder continuous function. Analytic functions are indeed C ∞ functions with bounded derivatives, but in contrast to [19] the algorithm we design is accurate even for a non-constant data dimension. In fact, for a non-constant ℓ the error bound in [19] grows exponentially in ℓ. Therefore, the mechanism provided in this paper extends the result introduced by Wang et al. [19] to non-constant data dimensions 1 . The mechanism provided in [13] builds on the mechanism of [19] , but the major advantage is that it outputs a synthetic database, which is usually appealing. The mechanisms given in this work do not construct a synthetic database but are based on simple algorithms which are widely used in computer graphics and approximation theory.
Preliminaries

Model
In this work, we consider the metric space X = [0, 1], where is a positive integer, endowed with the ℓ 1 norm. Let D ∈ X n be a database consisting of n points in X . We refer to n as the size of the database D. Let furthermore F : X n × Y → R, for some set Y ⊇ X . We consider query classes Q F = {F (·, x)|x ∈ X }. Once the database D is fixed, we denote by
In Section 3, we first fix = 1 and Y = X and examine the problem of privately answering queries which are defined by one-dimensional Hölder continuous functions
In Section 4, we consider Y = D R = {z ∈ C : |z| < R} and focus on the particular case of F D being analytic on a complex disc of radius R larger than 1, although we always assume
where the coefficients c s are given by the Cauchy integrals
where C ⊆ D R is any contour enclosing the point z 0 .
In both of the aforementioned cases, we provide private and efficient query release mechanisms in the non-interactive setting. A non-interactive query release mechanism takes a query class Q F and a database D as inputs and outputs a data structure A which can be used to answer all the queries in the class without further accessing the database. In our scenario, the query class is Q F = {F (·, x)|x ∈ X }, for a function F : X n × Y → R. Moreover, a query release mechanism is said to be efficient if both the running time of the mechanism and the running time for answering a query using the data structure it outputs are polynomial in n, and 1/S(F ), where S(F ) denotes the sensitivity of F , which is formally introduced in Definition 4. We conclude this section underlining that the complexity-related statements presented in this paper are always under the assumption that the function F is polynomially evaluable.
Differential privacy
In this paper, we aim at constructing query release mechanisms which provide strong privacy guarantees. For this reason, we consider the well-established notion of differential privacy.
Definition 3 ([7]
). Let R be a (possibly infinite) set. A mechanism M Q : X * → R (meaning that, for every D ∈ X * and query class Q, M Q (D) is an R-valued random variable) is said to provide ε-differential privacy if, for every n ∈ N, for every pair (D, D ′ ) ∈ X n × X n of databases which differ in one entry only, and for every measurable S ⊆ R, we have
The Laplace distribution has been shown to be one of the most useful tools for providing ε-differential privacy. For any λ > 0, the Laplace distribution Lap(λ) is the continuous distribution given by the density function h(y)
d . Adding Laplace-distributed noise to an R d -valued function f provides privacy if the parameter λ is properly calibrated to the sensitivity of f .
Definition 4 ([7]
). The sensitivity of a function f :
where the supremum is taken over all D, D ′ ∈ X n that differ in one entry only. The sensitivity of a functions F : X n × Y → R d is similarly defined:
Moreover, ε-differentially private mechanisms compose well.
Given a query release mechanism, we measure the accuracy of the answers computed using the data structure it outputs as follows.
and let Q F be the corresponding query class. A data structure A is (α, β)-accurate if for any database D ∈ X n , with probability at
Releasing Hölder continuous functions
In this section, we focus on the 1-dimensional case and consider Y = X = [0, 1]. We furthermore assume that the function F (which defines the query class Q F ) is such that, for every D ∈ X n , F D is a (γ, L)-Hölder continuous function, with 0 < γ ≤ 1 and L > 0. We introduce an efficient, non-interactive and private mechanism for releasing the answers to a query class parametrized by (γ, L)-Hölder continuous functions. We formally state the main result of this section in the following
n . For ε > 0 and 0 < β < 1, there exists a non-interactive ε-differentially private mechanism for releasing the answers to the query class Q F that is (α, β)-accurate with α satisfying
where ξ = γ/(γ + 2). Moreover, the running-time of the mechanism and the runningtime per query are both polynomial in 1/S(F ) and n.
Proof overview. In order to prove Theorem 3, we make use of a beautiful result due to Mathé on the approximation of Hölder continuous functions by Bernstein polynomials [15] . We introduce these polynomials and some of their properties in Section 3.1 (for a more comprehensive survey we refer to [14] ). The approximation polynomial we construct consists of a linear combination of so-called Bernstein basis polynomials, whose coefficients depend on the function we aim to approximate, namely F D . Thus, only the coefficients of the polynomial approximation of F D are sensitive and need to be protected. In order to provide ε-differential privacy, we add Laplace-distributed noise to these coefficients, according to Lemma 1. In this way, we can release the sanitized coefficients and use them for efficiently computing the answers to the queries in Q F , without further access to the database D. For proving the accuracy of the answers provided by our mechanism, we separately analyze the two sources of error involved, one due to the polynomial approximation of F D and the other due to the addition of Laplace-distributed noise. In both cases, we provide bounds on the error introduced, completing the proof of Theorem 3 in Section 3.2.
Bernstein polynomials
In this section, we briefly introduce the Bernstein basis polynomials and state some of their properties. We then define the Bernstein polynomial of a function f and present the bound on the approximation error for (γ, L)-Hölder continuous functions [15] .
The Bernstein basis polynomials of degree k are defined as follows:
The Bernstein basis polynomials have many interesting properties. In this work, we only make use of the following two.
Proposition 4 ([14]
). For any k ∈ N and 0 ≤ ν ≤ k, the following holds:
We can now define the Bernstein polynomial of a function f and present the main result of this section.
The Bernstein polynomial of f of degree k is defined as follows:
Corollary 6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 5,
Proof of Theorem 3
In order to prove the theorem, we provide an efficient and non-interactive mechanism for releasing a class Q F parametrized by (γ, L)-Hölder continuous functions F D . We then show that it provides ε-differential privacy and is (α, β)-accurate. We first observe that, for a given database D and a (γ, L)-Hölder continuous function F D , the Bernstein polynomial of F D can be thought to as an efficient algorithm for releasing the answers to the entire query class. In fact, in order to compute approximate answers to the queries in Q F , we only need to evaluate F D on (polynomially many) equidistant points in the interval [0, 1] and evaluate its Bernstein polynomial on the points of interest. Let us first fix k ∈ N. Since only the coefficients of the Bernstein polynomial depend on the sensitive database D, our mechanism is defined by the following random map M :
where Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y k ) is a random vector drawn according to Lap
Lemma 7. Let ε > 0. Choose the random map M according to (3) . Then M provides ε-differential privacy.
Proof. Let D ′ ∈ X n be a second database differing from D in one entry only. Let furthermore φ : X n → R k+1 be the map defined by
According to Lemma 1 (applied with k + 1 in place of d), the mechanism M provides ε-differential privacy.
In order to analyze the accuracy of our mechanism, we denote bỹ
the Bernstein polynomial constructed using the coefficients output by the mechanism M. The error α introduced by the mechanism can be expressed as
Observe that the first summand is bounded by L
4k
γ/2 , according to Corollary 6.
For every x ∈ [0, 1], the second summand consists of the absolute value of a convex linear combination of independent Laplace-distributed random variables. For bounding this sum, we use the following tail bound. 
The proof of Proposition 8 follows from a powerful result provided in [16] . For completeness, we give the proof in Section A. Propositions 4 and 8 imply the following Corollary 9. For ν = 0, . . . , k, let Y ν ∼ Lap(λ) be i.i.d. random variables. Then, for δ ≥ 0, we have:
Corollary 9 implies that with probability at least 1 − β the second summand in (5) is bounded by S(F )(k+1) ε log(1/β). All in all, the error in (4) can be bounded as follows:
Note that the first summand in (6) is a decreasing function in k, while the second summand is an increasing function in k. Therefore, the optimal choice for k is obtained when the two summands are equal, i.e.
Defining ξ = γ/(γ + 2) and substituting Equation (7) into (6), we get
concluding the proof of Theorem 3. The analysis of the running time of the mechanism and the running time for answering a query is straightforward and hence omitted.
Releasing analytic functions
In this section, we keep focusing on the 1-dimensional case, i.e. X = [0, 1], but we consider query classes Q F where F D is an analytic function on a complex disc D R of radius R > 1, i.e. Y = D R . As already pointed out in Section 2.1, we also assume
When F has these properties, we introduce a differentially private mechanism which releases the answers to the query class Q F achieving a substantially better accuracy than the mechanism provided in Section 3.2. The main result we are going to prove in this section is the following.
Theorem 10. Let R > 1, D R = {z ∈ C : |z| < R} and F be such that F D : D R → C is an analytic function on D R and F D ((−R, R)) ⊆ R for every D ∈ X n . For ε > 0 and 0 < β < 1, there exists a non-interactive ε-differentially private mechanism for releasing the answers to the query class Q F that is (α, β)-accurate with α satisfying
Moreover, the mechanism runs in polynomial time in 1/S(F ) and n. The runningtime per query is logarithmic in 1/S(F ).
Remark 10.1. Note that, in Theorem 3, the error depends on (S(F )/ε) ξ , where ξ ≤ 1/3. If the function F D is furthermore analytic and ε = ω(S(F )), the accuracy can be significantly boosted (the dependence on S(F )/ε becomes quasi-linear).
Proof overview. The proof of Theorem 10 is similar to that of Theorem 3, with a few peculiarities. Instead of approximating the function F D by means of a Bernstein polynomial, we use a polynomial interpolant at the roots of unity. We made this choice since polynomial interpolation on the real line is known to generate Vandermonde matrices with a high condition number [8, 9] , making this approach unsuitable for an application to differential privacy. On the other hand, the Vandermonde matrix of the polynomial interpolant at the roots of unity shows nice stability properties [8] , as we detail in Section 4.1. The coefficients of the polynomial that interpolates F D at these points are thus properly perturbed adding Laplace-distributed noise, according to Lemma 1. In this way, the coefficients can be published and it is possible to use the sanitized interpolant for efficiently computing the answers to the queries in Q F , without further need of the sensitive database. In order to prove the accuracy of the mechanism, we provide bounds on the error introduced by the polynomial interpolation and by the addition of Laplace-distributed noise, in a similar fashion as in the proof of Theorem 3. The improvement on the accuracy follows directly from the fact that the interpolation error decays exponentially in the number of interpolation points (for the Bernstein polynomial, instead, the error decays only polynomially in the number of points).
Polynomial interpolation at the roots of unity
In this section, we briefly recall some results about polynomial interpolation at the roots of unity. Henceforth, we always denote the imaginary unit by i. Moreover, for A = (a s,t ) ∈ C k×k , we denote A 1 = max 1≤t≤k k s=1 |a s,t |.
Definition 8. Let k ∈ N and let ω k = e 2πi/k . Assume f : D R → C, for some R > 1. The polynomial interpolant of f at the k-th roots of unity is defined as
is the solution of the following linear system:
Observe that if f is analytic and f ((−R, R)) ⊆ R, then f (z) = f (z) for every z ∈ D R (here the overbar indicates the complex conjugate). It is then easy to show that a k ∈ R k (see for example [17] ). We now present a simple result on the norm of the Vandermonde matrix V k .
Lemma 11 ([8]). For any
We conclude this section showing an upper bound on the convergence rate of the interpolant p k .
Although this is a well-known result in approximation theory, we refer to [1] for a very simple proof of this lemma.
Proof of Theorem 10
Similarly to Section 3.2, we provide an efficient and non-interactive mechanism for releasing a class Q F parametrized by analytic functions F D . We then show that it provides ε-differential privacy and is (α, β)-accurate. In order to get (approximate) answers to the queries specified in Q F , we need to compute the polynomial interpolant of F D at the roots of unity. As for the Bernstein polynomials, we are only interested in a perturbed version of the coefficients of the interpolant, since it is the only part of the polynomial which depends on the sensitive
Our mechanism for analytic functions is defined by the following random map M :
where Y = (Y 0 , . . . , Y k−1 ) is a random vector drawn according to Lap
Lemma 14. Let ε > 0. Choose the random map M according to (8) . Then M provides ε-differential privacy.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 7. Let D ′ ∈ X n be a second database differing from D in one entry only. According to Corollary 12, we get
Applying Lemma 1 (with k in place of d) yields the desired conclusion.
We denote byp k (z) =
s the interpolant constructed using the coefficients output by the mechanism M. Similarly to Section 3.2, the error α introduced by the mechanism can be expressed as
Observe that the first summand is bounded by O(1/(R k )), according to Lemma 13. The second summand in (10) can be written as
For bounding this term, we use the following proposition, whose proof is provided in Section B.
Then, for each δ ≥ 0 the following holds:
Pr max
Proposition 15 implies that with probability at least 1 − β the second summand in (10) is bounded by
log(1/β). The error in (9) can be thus bounded by
As already discussed in Section 3.2, we choose k such that the decreasing and increasing terms in k on the right-hand side of (11) are equal. This yields
, from which we can obtain the desired bound
We conclude the proof of Theorem 10 observing that, for our choice of k, the running time of the mechanism is polynomial in 1/S(F ) and n (if we take into account the time needed for running through the entries of the database D). The running time for computing the answer to a query is instead proportional to k, i.e. logarithmic in 1/S(F ).
Remark 15.1. If F D is a polynomial (with real coefficients) of degree q, the error bound becomes O S(F ) ε log(1/β) . In fact choosing k = q + 1, the polynomial interpolant p k coincides with the function F D and therefore the approximation error is zero. Hence, Proposition 15 implies that with probability at least 1 − β the error is bounded by O S(F ) ε log(1/β) .
Extension to the multi-dimensional case
In Sections 3 and 4, we presented two mechanisms for releasing the answers to a query class Q F parametrized by 1-dimensional Hölder continuous functions and analytic functions, respectively. In this section, we show that, under certain conditions, these two mechanisms can be used as building blocks even in the multi-dimensional case, i.e. when X = [0, 1] ℓ , for some ℓ ∈ N. A naive way of extending our mechanisms would be considering the multi-dimensional approximation via Bernstein polynomials and polynomial interpolation at the roots of unity. However, this approach is only applicable when the dimension ℓ is constant, since the running time of the two mechanisms we proposed becomes exponential in ℓ. In fact, the number of points in which we need to evaluate our function F D grows exponentially in the dimension ℓ in both the approximation algorithms we exploited in this work. Therefore, whenever ℓ is not constant, the mechanisms derived from the multi-dimensional approximation are inefficient. Nevertheless, the mechanisms defined in Sections 3 and 4 can be directly used in order to efficiently release the answers to a query class Q F when F is parametrized by additively separable functions. For simplicity, we introduce this definition for real functions, but it can be easily extended to complex functions as well. ℓ ) ⊆ R for every D ∈ X n . For ε > 0 and 0 < β < 1, the following results hold:
• There exists an efficient non-interactive ε-differentially private mechanism for releasing the answers to the query class Q F that is (α, β)-accurate with α satisfying
where ξ = γ/(γ + 2).
• There exists an efficient non-interactive ε-differentially private mechanism for releasing the answers to the query class Q G that is (α, β)-accurate with α satisfying
Proof. Since the class of queries we aim to release with (α, β)-accuracy is parametrized by additively separable Hölder continuous functions (resp. analytic functions)
, it suffices to apply the mechanism in Section 3 (resp. Section 4) to each function f j , where the parameters α, β and ε in Theorem 3 (resp. Theorem 10) must be replaced by α/ℓ, β/ℓ and ε/ℓ, respectively. Privacy then follows by Lemma 2. Finally, the bound on the error follows by an application of the union bound and by the same arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3 (resp. Theorem 10).
Some examples
In this section, we present some concrete examples of query classes that can be efficiently and privately released by the mechanisms introduced in this work.
Example 1
, where · 2 denotes the ℓ 2 -norm. The class Q F = {F (·, x)|x ∈ X } is the class of mean square distance queries on X and the answer to a given query F (·, x) is the average square distance from x to the elements in the database. Since F D is an additively separable function composed by analytic functions on D ℓ R for every D ∈ X n (each of them is indeed a polynomial with real coefficients), we can privately release this class with an additive error O ℓ 2 nε log(ℓ/β) , according to Theorem 16 and Remark 15.1. Note that this query class is a subclass of distance queries [12] , but our mechanism achieves a substantially better accuracy compared to the general mechanism for distance queries proposed in [12] .
Example 2
Another interesting query class which can be privately released by our mechanism for analytic functions is the class of inner product queries. For instance, inner product queries can be used for measuring the similarity between a given vector x ∈ [0, 1] ℓ and the elements stored in a database. More specifically, consider X = [0, 1] ℓ , R > 1 and F : X n × D nε log(ℓ/β) . Finally, observe that inner product queries are no longer distance queries, therefore the result of [12] does not even apply.
Example 3
We conclude this section presenting another query class that measures the similarity (resp. dissimilarity) between probability distributions on a set of features. 
